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We use sovereign debt rating estimations from Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2009, 
2010) for Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s, to assess to what extent the recent 
fiscal imbalances are being reflected on the sovereign debt notations. We use macro 
and fiscal data up to 2009, and macro and fiscal projections, to obtain the expected 
rating for several OECD countries. The answer to the title question is yes, but in a 
diverse way for each country. Our average model predictions point to a heterogeneous 
behaviour of rating agencies across countries. 
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Existing studies on the determinants of sovereign ratings find that rating 
agencies look at several variables when attributing a rating notation: per capita 
income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, level of economic development, default 
history, unemployment rate or the investment-to-GDP ratio (see, for instance, Cantor 
and Packer, 1996, Afonso, 2003, and Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005). Moreover, 
variables that reflect how the government conducts its fiscal policy, the budget 
balance and government debt are also relevant. These results are particularly 
significant for developed economies while for emerging economies other variables 
such as foreign reserves, current account balance, exports or terms of trade also seem 
to play an important role.  
Out of these variables, Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2009, 2010) have shown that 
four fundamental variables have a consistent short-run impact on sovereign ratings, 
determining roughly the rating ladder: the level of GDP per capita, real GDP growth, 
the public debt level and the government budget balance. In addition to undermining 
economic growth, as shown by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), it seems reasonable to 
think that high fiscal imbalances can increase the likelihood of sovereign defaults. 
In this study we use the estimated models for sovereign debt rating from Afonso, 
Gomes and Rother (2009, 2010), for Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s (S&P), to 
assess to what extent the deterioration of fiscal imbalances since 2008 in several 
OECD countries is being reflected on the sovereign debt ratings. For that purpose we 
use macro and fiscal data up to 2009, and macro and fiscal projections, to make a 
prediction for the expected rating for several OECD countries up until 2011 (the 
countries covered in the analysis are: Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S.).  
The answer to the title question seems to be yes, but in a diverse way for each 
country. We find that most of the deterioration of sovereign creditworthiness over the 
past two year is due to the increase of government deficits and debt, rather then the 
poor economic performance. Moreover, our rating predictions point to an under rating 
of Greece, Ireland and Portugal relative to the average country prediction. On the 
other hand, the rating agencies seem to be more lenient with Japan, UK, US and, 
although to a lesser extent, with France and Italy. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section Two we explain the methodology 
followed by Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2010) and summarise their results. In Section 
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Three we conduct the forecast of the ratings for each country and discuss its results. 
Section Four summarises the paper’s main findings. 
 
2. Methodology 
Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2010) initially estimated rating models for a panel 
of 130 countries for the period 1995-2005, using both linear estimation methods and 
ordered response models.  The detailed results and data description are reported in 
Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2010). 
 
Linear estimation: random effects 
The equation to estimate by random effects is  
 
 ( X ) ( )Xi iit it i i itR X Z            , (1) 
 
where we have: Rit – quantitative variable, obtained by a linear transformation; Xit is a 
vector containing time varying variables and Zi is a vector of time invariant variables. 
The time-average of the explanatory variables, iX , is also include as an additional 
time-invariant regressor. The index i (i=1,…,N) denotes the country, and the index t 
(t=1,…,T) indicates the period. Additionally, it is assumed that the disturbances µit are 
independent across countries and across time, and i  is uncorrelated with the 
regressors. 
Equation (1) has an interesting economic interpretation.     can be 
interpreted as a long-term effect (e. g. if a country has a permanent high 
unemployment what is the effect on the rating) while  is a short-term effect (e. g. if a 
country manages to reduce unemployment this year what is the impact on the rating). 
This distinction is useful for policy purposes as it can tell what a country can do to 
improve its rating in the short to medium-term. Alternatively, we can understand δ as 
the coefficient of the cross-country determinants of the credit rating.  
An advantage of this framework is that it allows us to estimate i  for each 
country, which would capture any unobserved characteristic of the country, which 
have a permanent impact on its rating. 
The cardinal transformation of the ratings was done following the 
correspondence with the qualitative codes shown in Table 1, using a linear scale with 
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numerical equivalents between 1 and 17, as already used in (3). Therefore, the 
maximum sovereign rating takes the value 17 (corresponding to AAA for S&P and 
Fitch, and Aaa for Moody’s) and the lower limit of one encompasses all rating 
notations below B- (for S&P and Fitch) and below B3 (for Moody’s).1 In the Annex 
we report the historical ratings since 1989 together with the estimated predictions per 
country for each model specification and for each rating agency.2  
 
Table 1 – S&P, Moody’s and Fitch rating systems and linear transformations 
 
Characterization of debt and 
issuer (source: Moody’s) 
 Rating Linear 
transformation 
  S&P Moody’s  Fitch  
Highest quality AAA Aaa AAA 17 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 16 
AA Aa2 AA 15 High quality 
AA- Aa3 AA- 14 
A+ A1 A+ 13 
A A2 A 12 Strong payment capacity 
A- A3 A- 11 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 10 









BBB- Baa3 BBB- 8 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7 
BB Ba2 BB 6 Likely to fulfil obligations, ongoing uncertainty 
BB- Ba3 BB- 5 
B+ B1 B+ 4 
B B2 B 3 High credit risk 
B- B3 B- 2 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 
CCC Caa2 CCC Very high credit risk 
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 
CC Ca CC Near default with possibility 
of recovery   C 
SD C DDD 


















Ordered response models 
Although estimating the determinants of ratings using linear regression 
methods have, in general, a good predictive power, as ratings are a qualitative ordinal 
                                                        
1 According to Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2010), a numerical scale between 1 and 21 further 
disagregating the C notations, does not singificantly change the estimation results, while we are here 
also more interested in the upper part of the rating spectrum. 
2 Sovereing ratings have been available since the early 1930s. A further historical view is provided, for 
instance, by Ratha, De, and Mohapatra (2007). 
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measure, ordered response models are more suited. The rating agency makes a 
continuous evaluation of a country’s credit-worthiness, embodied in an unobserved 
latent variable *itR . The latent variable has a linear form and depends on the same set 
of variables as before, 
 
 * ( X ) Xi iit it i i itR X Z          . (2) 
 
There are several cut-off points to draw up the boundaries of each rating 











 ( )                          
 ( 1)                  
 ( 2)                     





AAA Aaa if R c
AA Aa if c R c
R AA Aa if c R c
B B if c R
 







The parameters of equation (2) and (3), notably β, δ, λ and the cut-off points c1 
to c16 are estimated using maximum likelihood. As we have panel data, the 
generalization of ordered probit is not simple, since instead of one error term, we now 
have two. One possibility is to use a random effects ordered probit estimation, which 
considers both errors i and µit to be normally distributed, and maximizes the log-
likelihood accordingly. The other alternative is to perform the traditional ordered 
probit estimation, but considering that the error term is autocorrelated. 
 
Summary of results 
Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2010) estimated such models for the period 1995-
2005. They use several variables grouped mainly in three categories: macroeconomic 
performance (log of GDP per capita PPP, GDP growth, unemployment rate, inflation 
rate), government variables (government debt, fiscal balance and a measure of 
government effectiveness) and external variables (foreign reserves, current account 
balance and external debt). 
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 As already mentioned, in this paper we are going to focus on the contribution 
of the macro and the fiscal elements. Generally the set of main macroeconomic and 
fiscal variables that we use in this study may determine sovereign ratings as follows.  
 GDP per capita – positive impact on rating: more developed economies are 
expected to have more stable institutions to prevent government over-borrowing and 
to be less vulnerable to exogenous shocks. 
 Real GDP growth – positive impact: higher real growth strengthens the 
government’s ability to repay outstanding obligations. 
 Unemployment – negative impact: a country with lower unemployment tends 
to have more flexible labour markets making it less vulnerable to changes in the 
economic environment. In addition, lower unemployment reduces the fiscal burden of 
unemployment and social benefits while broadening the base for labour taxation.  
 Inflation – uncertain impact: on the one hand, it reduces the real stock of 
outstanding government debt in domestic currency, leaving overall more resources for 
the coverage of foreign debt obligations. On the other hand, it is symptomatic of 
problems at the macroeconomic policy level, especially if caused by monetary 
financing of deficits. 
 Government debt – negative impact: a higher stock of outstanding 
government debt implies a higher interest burden and should correspond to a higher 
risk of default. 
 Fiscal balance – positive impact: large fiscal deficits absorb domestic 
savings and also suggest macroeconomic disequilibria, negatively affecting the rating 
level. Persistent deficits may signal problems with the institutional environment for 
policy makers. 
 Table 2 shows the effect on the rating of changes in the fiscal and macro 
variables, for the three agencies and for the three methodologies. The first conclusion is 
that, individually, changes in only one macro or fiscal variable have a small effect on a 
country’s sovereign rating. For instance, a reduction in GDP growth by 3 percent only reduces 
a country’s rating by 0.10 to 0.20 notches. However, given their interdependence, the effects 







Table 2 – Estimated effects of fiscal and macro variables 
 
Note: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. Fraction of 
a notch: for the ordered response models, it is in fraction of the average size of the categories between 
BBB- and AAA. 
 
We can also see from Table 2 that roughly the rating agencies tend to put more 
weight on the fiscal variables. An increase of 5 percentage points in the fiscal deficit 
would reduce the rating between 0.23 notches (for Fitch) and 0.5 (for Moody’s). It is 
also possible to observe that the rating agencies give more emphasis to different 
variables. Moody’s gives more emphasis to the government deficit, whereas S&P and 
Fitch focus more in government debt. 
Another important element is that, although the unemployment rate does not 
have a short-run effect on a country’s rating it has a significant long-run effect. The 
interpretation is that only structural unemployment seems to matter for the rating 
decision. 
 
























Notes: * prediction error within +/- 1 notch. ** prediction error within +/- 2 notches. 
 
 Fitch S&P Moody’s  
 Short-run effect of: RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg 
↓ 5%  GDP per capita -0.11 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.14 -0.15 -0.12 -0.14 
↓ 3%  GDP growth -0.13 -0.09 0.00 -0.07 -0.22 -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 -0.40 -0.14 -0.14 -0.23 
↑ 5% Inflation -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
↑  10% Gov. Debt -0.27 -0.28 -0.25 -0.27 -0.33 -0.30 -0.48 -0.37 -0.21 -0.15 -0.21 -0.19 
↑ 5% Gov. Deficit -0.28 -0.15 -0.27 -0.23 -0.37 -0.36 -0.29 -0.34 -0.53 -0.51 -0.49 -0.51 
Long run effect of:             
↑ 5% Unemployment 
rate 0.00 -0.10 -0.13 -0.08 -0.09 -0.14 0.00 -0.08 -0.34 -0.22 -0.17 -0.24 
% Correctly 
predicted 
% Within 1 
notch * 
% Within 2 
notches **  Estimation Procedure Observations 
   
RE with εi 557 64.8% 95.2% 99.6% 
RE without  εi 557 33.8% 75.6% 93.9% 
Ordered Probit 557 46.5% 79.7% 94.3% Moody’s 
RE Ordered Probit 557 43.8% 75.6% 92.3% 
RE with εi 565 69.4% 98.2% 99.6% 
RE without  εi 565 38.2% 79.1% 95.2% 
Ordered Probit 565 46.4% 84.8% 93.8% 
S&P 
RE Ordered Probit 565 38.6% 81.9% 94.3% 
RE with εi 481 70.5% 98.3% 99.4% 
RE without  εi 481 36.2% 77.5% 97.5% 
Ordered Probit 481 43.5% 82.1% 95.2% Fitch 
RE Ordered Probit 553 34.5% 77.2% 93.3% 
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In terms of prediction, the models correctly predict the rating of 40% of the 
sample and more than 75% of the predicted ratings lie within one notch of the 
observed value (see Table 3). When we include the estimated country error i , the 
prediction improves significantly, as it captures all unobservable country effects. 
 
3. Rating forecasts 
3.1. Forecast approach and data 
In order to make our country specific forecasts we use the previous estimation 
results up to 2005, together with macro and fiscal data up to 2009, and notably the 
more recent spring 2010 projections from the European Commission, to make 
predictions for the annual expected ratings up to 2011.   
As an example, and drawing on the results of the prediction specification, 
estimated by Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2010), the estimations for the changes in the 
ratings, using the random effects specification, are given by (4),  
 
 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
1 2 3 4 5 6 -1 it it it it it it it itR Ypc Y U D B R                   , (4) 
 
where Ypc is per capita GPD, Y is the real growth rate of GDP, U is the 
unemployment rate, D is debt-to-GDP ratio, and B is the government budget balance 
ratio. Notice that we report in (4) only the estimated coefficients of the explanatory 
variables for which we have available macro and fiscal forecast data for the period 
2010-2011.3 
Another important element is that the unemployment rate does not have a 
significant short-run effect, so instead we use the long-run coefficient, assuming that 
the increase in the unemployment rate is structural.4 For the random effects, we then 
round the number to the nearer integer to have a rating prediction. With the ordered 
probit framework we estimate the value of the latent variable in a similar way, and 
then compare the value with the cut-points to assess the rating. 
                                                        
3 For instance, the estimated coefficients for the average of the random effects specification for 
Moody’s are given below: 
-1 1.789 8.768 -0.073* -0.145* -0.014* 6.991*it it it it it it it itR Ypc Y U D B R          . 
4 In practice, this only matters for the case of Spain that had an increase in the unemployment rate of 




In this context, Figure 1 shows the recent developments of the government 
debt ratio and of the budget balance ratio for the countries under analysis, which 
illustrates the significant post 2007-2008 fiscal deterioration, with increasing 
government budget deficits and rising government indebtedness. 
 
Figure 1 – General government debt and budget balance ratios (% of GDP) 
 














































































IR GR UK PT SP US
  




















































































JP FR IT DE CA  
 
Source: European Commission AMECO database and spring 2010 Economic Forecasts. The debt ratio 
for Japan, not shown to facilitate the scale in the chart presentation, is 142% and 194% respectively in 
2000 and 2011. IR -  Ireland; GR - Greece, PT - Portugal, SP - Spain, FR - France, IT -  Italy, DE - 
Germany, CA - Canada. 
 
3.2. Country specific forecast 
We report below the set of results that depict the effective country ratings, 
observed up until July 2010, together with the illustration of the rating prediction that 
we computed using the several model specifications for the three rating agencies, for 
each country. We also computed the predicted ratings for 2010-2011 on the basis of 
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the available macro and fiscal forecasts. The main results are discussed for each of the 




The average rating prediction is in line with the effective AAA rating observed 
in the market on mid-June 2010 (Figure 2). Only in the case of Moody’s, for the 
random effects model, there is some evidence of effective over rating, by one notch, in 
the period 2009-2010. 
 
Figure 2 – Sovereign rating predictions for Canada 
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Notes: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. 17=AAA 








The overall result shows a prediction roughly half a notch bellow the triple A 
rating, for the period 2004-2011 (Figure 3). This is particularly the case for the 
estimated specifications for S&P and Fitch, while such conclusion cannot be drawn 
for the case of Moody’s. Therefore, and taking into account the abovementioned 
macro and fiscal fundamentals, the prediction results point to a slight effective over 
rating.  
 
Figure 3 – Sovereign rating predictions for France 
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Notes: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. 17=AAA 










For the random ordered probit models, and for the cases of S&P and Fitch, the 
prediction results show a rating somewhat below triple A, but not enough to imply an 
effective over rating (Figure 4). However, as in the case of France, the prediction 
results from the three alternative specifications for the case of Moody’s do not 
indicate a situation of effective over rating. Therefore, it seems that for the two largest 
euro area economies Moody’s has a somewhat different (more benign) assessment 
than the ones that are possible to model via the historical track record for S&P and 
Fitch. 
 
Figure 4 – Sovereign rating predictions for Germany 
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Notes: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. 17=AAA 








The average prediction from the three specifications and for the three rating 
agencies is around A for S&P and Fitch, and A2 for Moody’s (Figure 5). These model 
predictions are above the effective rating levels observed on mid-June 2010, which 
ranged from BB+ for S&P to A3 for Moody’s. Nevertheless, the model predictions 
rightly detect the downward movement in the Greek sovereign ratings from 2008 
onwards, following the economic and financial crisis and the ensuing deterioration of 
the fiscal scenario. Since then, the model predicts a downgrade between one to four 
notches. However, it seems that the S&P and Moody’s downgrades were much 
sharper than the predictions (a downgrade between 1 and 4 notches), when compared 
to a downgrade of two notches of Fitch. From these prediction results there seems to 
arise a situation of effective under rating for Greece. 
 
Figure 5 – Sovereign rating predictions for Greece 
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Notes: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. 17=AAA 





The average rating prediction for Ireland comes out slightly above the effective 
rating classification in the first half of 2010 (Figure 6). Indeed, while the effective Aa2 
rating from Moody’s is accurately reproduced by the average of the respective model 
specifications, the model predictions for S&P and for Fitch are roughly on notch 
above the 2010 rating. These prediction results would indicate an effective under 
rating situation at that time. Again, the triple A ratings are correctly predicted up to 
2008, and after that year the models correctly pick up the worsening of the fiscal and 
macro conditions. 
 
Figure 6 – Sovereign rating predictions for Ireland 
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Notes: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. 17=AAA 








For the case of Italy the average rating predictions are somewhat below the 
effective rating classification on mid-June 2010 (Figure 7). At that time, the effective 
rating is more clearly above the rating predictions resulting from the specifications for 
the case of S&P (for the ordered probit and for the random effects ordered probit 
models). Given such estimation evidence, one could label the effective average rating 
as being over rated by one notch. 
 
Figure 7 – Sovereign rating predictions for Italy 
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Notes: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. 17=AAA 










The average rating prediction for Japan is below the effective existing rating 
classifications on mid-June 2010 (Figure 8). Moreover, such effective over rating, of 
about one notch, has been also consistently picked up throughout the full prediction 
period, 2004-2011. These results are similar for the three rating agencies with the 
specification for S&P signalling even a higher effective over rating of two notches in 
the cases of the ordered probit and random effects ordered probit models during most 
of the period.  
 
Figure 8 – Sovereign rating predictions for Japan 
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Notes: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. 17=AAA 









For Portugal, the average rating prediction from the models’ estimations is 
around two notches above the effective rating average (Figure 9). This effective rating 
under rating vis-à-vis the model predictions is more pronounced in the case of S&P 
where the deviation reaches three notches for 2010. In fact, the rating of S&P is two 
and three notches below respectively the Moody’s and Fitch’s counterpart. Again, the 
estimated models are able to track, on average, the recent rating downgrade, reflecting 
the less favourable fiscal and macro developments and their respective projections for 
2010-2011 by the European Commission.  
 
Figure 9 – Sovereign rating predictions for Portugal 
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Notes: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. 17=AAA 








The average predictions are essentially in line with the average of the effective 
2010 ratings (Figure 10). Such conclusion is also valid for the past recent years. 
However, it is interesting to notice that the rating predictions for the models estimated 
for Moody’s reflect an effective over rating in 2010, of one notch, which is also 
estimated for 2011 (across the three specifications). Therefore, we can observe for 
Moody’s a situation somewhat similar to the cases seen before for Germany and 
France. 
 
Figure 10 – Sovereign rating predictions for Spain 
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Notes: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. 17=AAA 









Regarding the U.K. the averaging of the model rating predictions indicates the 
existence of an effective over rating of more than one notch (Figure 11). Indeed, for 
2010-2011, all models produce an estimated sovereign rating below the effective 2010 
rating. This difference is more relevant in the case of S&P for 2011, where the 
potential effective over rating could be around two notches. 
 
Figure 11 – Sovereign rating predictions for the U.K. 
Figure 11.1 Figure 11.2 
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Notes: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. 17=AAA 











For the case of the U.S. the average of the estimated ratings is more than one 
notch below the average effective rating in the beginning of 2010 (Figure 12). Such 
effective over rating is around two notches in the case of S&P in 2010-2011. 
Interestingly, the increase in the estimated effective over rating is picked up as early 
as 2008, although it was already possible to be tracked since 2004 for the S&P and the 
Fitch specifications. 
 
Figure 12 – Sovereign rating predictions for the U.S. 
Figure 12.1 Figure 12.2 
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Notes: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. 17=AAA 









3.3. Overview of the forecast  
Table 4 further summarises the deviations of the average country prediction 
results vis-à-vis the effective mid-June 2010 average ratings of the three rating 
agencies. It can be seen that for 2010 the three main rating agencies seem to be 
attributing too low sovereign ratings for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, taking into 
account the main macro and fiscal determinants used in the model specifications used 
in this study. Therefore, one may see in these results some evidence of effective under 
rating for those countries. On the other hand, the estimated prediction results point to 
the existence of a relative over rating vis-à-vis the average country for France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. 
 
Table 4 – 3-agency average effective (mid-June) 2010 rating vis-à-vis the average 
model predictions 
 
 Effective rating vis-
à-vis the prediction 
Notches of effective over (+) 
and under (-) rating 
Canada equal 0 
France above +1 
Germany equal 0 
Greece below -4 
Ireland below -1 
Italy above +1 
Japan above +2 
Portugal below -2 
Spain equal 0 
UK above +1 
US above +1 
 
Table 5 shows the importance of fiscal elements in explaining the deterioration 
of the ratings, as percentage of total. We can see that for most countries, the increase 
in government debt and in the budget deficit contributed between 60 and 100 percent 
to the reduction of creditworthiness. 
Again, one must bear in mind that we are only using, for the prediction of the 
ratings, the macro and fiscal variables, in order to be able to do the corresponding 
forecasts for the period 2010-2011, for which we use the European Commission 
forecasts. Therefore, other rating determinants may actually play a role in mitigating 
the extent of the under rating or over rating situations reported in this study. 
Additionally, the model was estimated for 100 countries and was not specific to 
OECD countries. Other important elements might be the maturity structure of the 
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government debt; and the possibility that rating agencies also assess banking sector 
developments, which can also impinge on fiscal imbalances.5 
 
Table 5 – Contribution of fiscal elements (2008-2011), % of total 
  Fitch S&P Moody's 




Canada 1.14 1.17 1.13 1.15 1.00 1.05 1.08 1.05 0.89 1.05 1.03 0.99 1.06 
France 0.80 0.72 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.77 0.89 0.81 0.60 0.66 0.72 0.66 0.74 
Germany 0.68 0.64 0.75 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.80 0.74 0.52 0.61 0.67 0.60 0.68 
Greece 0.74 0.66 0.72 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.85 0.74 0.45 0.54 0.62 0.54 0.66 
Ireland 0.75 0.64 0.69 0.70 0.73 0.71 0.85 0.76 0.52 0.59 0.66 0.59 0.68 
Italy 0.66 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.63 0.78 0.69 0.44 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.60 
Japan 1.20 1.28 1.28 1.25 1.02 1.12 1.11 1.08 0.92 1.18 1.11 1.07 1.13 
Portugal 0.81 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.89 0.82 0.62 0.67 0.74 0.68 0.76 
Spain 0.77 0.63 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.68 0.86 0.75 0.49 0.57 0.64 0.57 0.67 
UK 0.74 0.67 0.72 0.71 0.76 0.74 0.84 0.78 0.60 0.63 0.70 0.64 0.71 
US 1.04 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.92 1.03 0.96 0.75 0.85 0.89 0.83 0.92 
 
Note: RE - Random Effects; OP - Ordered Probit; REOP - Random Effects Ordered Probit. 
 
Finally, the relevance of the sovereign rating notations can also be summarised 
in terms of the additional basis points that a sovereign issuer would have to pay, on 
average, above the triple A rating. Such additional premium is reported in terms of 
basis points in Table 6, where the end of the year yields and ratings were used. For 
instance, it is possible to observe that BBB rated sovereigns ended up paying in the 
past, and on average, around 300 basis points more than an AAA issuer. 
  
Table 6 – Average yield spread of government bonds over sovereign AAA 
bonds (1996-2009) 
 
Rating AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- 
Basis points 0 8 3 29 71 100 159 275 312 297 
 
Source: Reuters and for the yields and own calculations. 
Note: countries included are Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal, Finland, Malta, Denmark, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Sweden, 
United States, and Canada. Japan was dropped form the calculation due to the fact that rather low yields would 
generate sometimes marginally negative spreads. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We used the estimated ordered response models for sovereign debt rating from 
Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2009, 2010), for Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s, 
                                                        
5 Gerlach, Schulz and Wolff (2010) argue that when financial markets perceive a larger risk that 




to assess to what extent the recent fiscal imbalances in several OECD countries are 
being reflected on the sovereign debt notations. For that purpose we use macro and 
fiscal data up to 2009, and macro and fiscal projections for 2010-2011, to compute the 
expected sovereign ratings for eleven OECD countries. 
When computing the predicted sovereign ratings we used, for each country, and 
for each of the three rating agencies, three different estimations methods: random 
effects, ordered probit, and random effects ordered probit. In that way, we are able to 
gain more robustness for the calculations by averaging all the rating predictions to 
compare with the effective rating notation. 
According to our results, we observe an overall downgrading in sovereign debt 
ratings from the computed predictions in the period 2009-2011. Therefore, fiscal 
worsening, together with less optimistic macro scenarios are indeed translated into 
lower sovereign ratings. The importance of the fiscal variables, government debt and 
fiscal deficit, to explain the deterioration of the sovereign ratings, is between 60 and 
100 percent of the reduction of creditworthiness.  
However, the response has not been homogeneous across rating agencies. The 
rating predictions that we computed also point to a relative over rating vis-à-vis the 
average country of France, Italy, Japan, U.K. and U.S. of around one and two notches. 
On the other hand, a relative average under rating in the cases of Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal was uncovered, ranging between one and four notches.  
How can we explain this asymmetry? These predictions came from a model 
estimated for 60 countries, so they reflect the behaviour of agencies when rating an 
average country. These differences can be explained if agencies are looking at other 
variables that are more relevant now, such as the stability of the financial system, the 
maturity structure of debt or other political factors. One can envisage that for the 
average under rated country, the agencies seem to see a worse medium-term outlook 
not reflected in the current projection of fundamentals, while for the average over 
rated country, rating agencies may be expecting a return to more normal fiscal and 
macro conditions in the medium- term. On the other hand, rating agencies could be 
keener to attribute higher ratings in boom times, when investor’s trust on the economy 
tends to rise, and the risk of rating misspecification is lower for the agencies’ 
reputation (see Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, 2009).  
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However, we cannot exclude that some of the effective sovereign ratings may 
also be prompted by an overall increase in risk aversion that trickled down to country 
specific ratings. 
All in all, governments need to be aware of the importance of sound fiscal 
policies in order to decrease the risk perception of capital markets and investors vis-à-
vis their levels of government indebtedness.  
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Annex – Rating history and predictions 
Table A1 – Canada 
 Rating Rating Code Fitch S&P Moody's   
Year Fitch SP M FC17 SPC17 MC17 Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg Avg 
1989  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1990  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1991  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1992  AA+ Aaa  16 17                    
1993  AA+ Aaa  16 17                    
1994 AA AA+ Aa1 15 16 16                    
1995 AA AA+ Aa2 15 16 15                    
1996 AA AA+ Aa2 15 16 15 15.3 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 15 15.0 15.0 
1997 AA AA+ Aa2 15 16 15 15.3 15 15 15 15.0 16 16 16 16.0 15 15 16 15.3 15.4 
1998 AA AA+ Aa2 15 16 15 15.3 15 15 16 15.3 16 16 16 16.0 16 16 16 16.0 15.8 
1999 AA AA+ Aa2 15 16 15 15.3 16 15 16 15.7 16 16 16 16.0 16 16 17 16.3 16.0 
2000 AA AA+ Aa1 15 16 16 15.7 16 15 16 15.7 17 16 16 16.3 16 17 17 16.7 16.2 
2001 AA+ AA+ Aa1 16 16 16 16.0 16 15 16 15.7 16 16 16 16.0 16 17 17 16.7 16.1 
2002 AA+ AAA Aaa 16 17 17 16.7 16 16 16 16.0 17 16 16 16.3 16 17 17 16.7 16.3 
2003 AA+ AAA Aaa 16 17 17 16.7 16 16 17 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16 17 17 16.7 16.7 
2004 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 16 17 17 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16 17 17 16.7 16.8 
2005 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2006 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2007 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2008 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2009 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 16 17 17 16.7 16.9 
2010 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 16 17 17 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16 17 17 16.7 16.8 
2011               16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 16 17 17 17 16.8 
 
Table A2 – France 
 Rating Rating Code Fitch S&P Moody's   
Year Fitch SP M FC17 SPC17 MC17 Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg Avg 
1989  AAA    17                     
1990  AAA    17                     
1991  AAA    17                     
1992  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1993  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1994 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17                    
1995 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17                    
1996 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.6 
1997 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.6 
1998 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.6 
1999 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 15 15.7 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.3 
2000 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 15 15.7 17 16 15 16.0 17 16 17 16.7 16.1 
2001 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 15 15.7 17 16 15 16.0 17 17 17 17.0 16.2 
2002 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 15 16.0 17 16 15 16.0 17 17 17 17.0 16.3 
2003 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 15 16.0 17 17 17 17.0 16.4 
2004 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.6 
2005 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.6 
2006 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
2007 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
2008 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
2009 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 16 15 16.0 17 17 17 17.0 16.6 
2010 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 15 16.0 17 17 17 17.0 16.4 
2011               17 16 16 16 16 16 15 16 17 17 17 17 16.3 
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Table A3 – Germany 
 Rating Rating Code Fitch S&P Moody's   
Year Fitch SP M FC17 SPC17 MC17 Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg Avg 
1989  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1990  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1991  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1992  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1993  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1994 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17                    
1995 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17                    
1996 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 16.9 
1997 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
1998 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
1999 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
2000 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.7 
2001 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.7 
2002 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.7 
2003 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
2004 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.7 
2005 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.7 
2006 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
2007 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.9 
2008 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.9 
2009 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
2010 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
2011               17 17 16 17 17 17 16 17 17 17 17 17 16.8 
 
Table A4 – Greece 
 Rating Rating Code Fitch S&P Moody's   
Year Fitch SP M FC17 SPC17 MC17 Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg Avg 
1989  BBB    9                     
1990  BBB-    8                     
1991  BBB-    8                     
1992  BBB-    8                     
1993  BBB-    8                     
1994  BBB-    8                     
1995 BBB- BBB-   8 8                     
1996 BBB- BBB- Baa1 8 8 10 8.7 11 12 12 11.7 10 11 11 10.7 11 12 13 12.0 11.4 
1997 BBB BBB- Baa1 9 8 10 9.0 11 11 12 11.3 10 11 11 10.7 11 11 13 11.7 11.2 
1998 BBB BBB Baa1 9 9 10 9.3 11 12 12 11.7 11 12 11 11.3 12 13 13 12.7 11.9 
1999 BBB+ A- A2 10 11 12 11.0 11 12 13 12.0 11 12 12 11.7 12 13 13 12.7 12.1 
2000 A- A- A2 11 11 12 11.3 10 11 12 11.0 11 12 11 11.3 12 12 13 12.3 11.6 
2001 A A A2 12 12 12 12.0 11 11 12 11.3 11 12 11 11.3 12 11 13 12.0 11.6 
2002 A A A1 12 12 13 12.3 11 12 13 12.0 11 12 12 11.7 12 12 13 12.3 12.0 
2003 A+ A+ A1 13 13 13 13.0 11 12 14 12.3 11 12 12 11.7 12 13 14 13.0 12.3 
2004 A A A1 12 12 13 12.3 11 14 14 13.0 11 12 12 11.7 12 13 14 13.0 12.6 
2005 A A A1 12 12 13 12.3 12 14 14 13.3 12 13 13 12.7 12 13 14 13.0 13.0 
2006 A A A1 12 12 13 12.3 12 14 15 13.7 12 13 13 12.7 13 14 14 13.7 13.3 
2007 A A A1 12 12 13 12.3 12 15 15 14.0 12 14 13 13.0 13 14 15 14.0 13.7 
2008 A A A1 12 12 13 12.3 12 15 15 14.0 12 14 13 13.0 13 15 15 14.3 13.8 
2009 BBB+ BBB+ A3 10 10 11 10.3 12 14 14 13.3 11 12 12 11.7 12 14 14 13.3 12.8 
2010 BBB+ BB+ Ba1 10 7 7 8.0 11 13 14 12.7 11 12 11 11.3 12 13 13 12.7 12.2 




Table A5 – Ireland 
 Rating Rating Code Fitch S&P Moody's   
Year Fitch SP M FC17 SPC17 MC17 Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg Avg 
1989  AA- Aa3  14 14                    
1990  AA- Aa3  14 14                    
1991  AA- Aa3  14 14                    
1992  AA- Aa3  14 14                    
1993  AA- Aa3  14 14                    
1994 AA+ AA- Aa2 16 14 15                    
1995 AA+ AA Aa2 16 15 15                    
1996 AA+ AA Aa2 16 15 15 15.3 16 15 16 15.7 15 16 15 15.3 15 16 16 15.7 15.6 
1997 AA+ AA Aa2 16 15 15 15.3 16 16 16 16.0 16 16 16 16.0 16 17 17 16.7 16.2 
1998 AAA AA+ Aaa 17 16 17 16.7 16 17 16 16.3 16 16 16 16.0 16 17 17 16.7 16.3 
1999 AAA AA+ Aaa 17 16 17 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16 17 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
2000 AAA AA+ Aaa 17 16 17 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16 17 17 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.9 
2001 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2002 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2003 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2004 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2005 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2006 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2007 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2008 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 16 17 17 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.9 
2009 AA- AA Aa1 14 15 16 15.0 17 17 17 17.0 15 16 16 15.7 15 17 17 16.3 16.3 
2010 AA- AA Aa2 14 15 15 14.7 16 17 16 16.3 14 16 15 15.0 14 17 16 15.7 15.7 
2011               16 17 16 16 14 16 14 15 14 17 16 16 15.6 
 
Table A6 – Italy 
 Rating Rating Code Fitch S&P Moody's   
Year Fitch SP M FC17 SPC17 MC17 Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg Avg 
1989  AA+ Aaa  16 17                    
1990  AA+ Aaa  16 17                    
1991  AA+ Aa1  16 16                    
1992  AA+ Aa3  16 14                    
1993  AA A1  15 13                    
1994 AA AA A1 15 15 13                    
1995 AA- AA A1 14 15 13                    
1996 AA- AA Aa3 14 15 14 14.3 14 12 14 13.3 14 12 12 12.7 14 12 13 13.0 13.0 
1997 AA- AA Aa3 14 15 14 14.3 14 12 14 13.3 14 12 12 12.7 14 12 13 13.0 13.0 
1998 AA- AA Aa3 14 15 14 14.3 14 12 14 13.3 15 12 13 13.3 14 12 13 13.0 13.2 
1999 AA- AA Aa3 14 15 14 14.3 14 12 15 13.7 15 12 13 13.3 14 12 14 13.3 13.4 
2000 AA- AA Aa3 14 15 14 14.3 14 12 14 13.3 15 12 13 13.3 14 12 14 13.3 13.3 
2001 AA- AA Aa3 14 15 14 14.3 14 12 14 13.3 15 12 13 13.3 14 13 14 13.7 13.4 
2002 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15 15.0 14 12 15 13.7 15 13 13 13.7 14 13 14 13.7 13.7 
2003 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15 15.0 15 14 15 14.7 15 13 13 13.7 15 14 14 14.3 14.2 
2004 AA AA- Aa2 15 14 15 14.7 15 14 15 14.7 15 14 13 14.0 15 14 15 14.7 14.4 
2005 AA AA- Aa2 15 14 15 14.7 15 14 15 14.7 15 13 13 13.7 15 14 14 14.3 14.2 
2006 AA- A+ Aa2 15 14 15 14.7 15 14 15 14.7 15 14 13 14.0 15 15 15 15.0 14.6 
2007 AA- A+ Aa2 15 14 15 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 13 14.3 15 15 15 15.0 14.8 
2008 AA- A+ Aa2 15 14 15 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 13 14.3 16 15 15 15.3 14.9 
2009 AA- A+ Aa2 15 14 15 14.7 15 14 15 14.7 15 13 13 13.7 15 15 15 15.0 14.4 
2010 AA- A+ Aa2 15 14 15 14.7 15 14 15 14.7 15 13 13 13.7 15 14 14 14.3 14.2 




Table A7 – Japan 
 Rating Rating Code Fitch S&P Moody's   
Year Fitch SP M FC17 SPC17 MC17 Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg Avg 
1989  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1990  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1991  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1992  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1993  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1994 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17                    
1995 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17                    
1996 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 16 16.3 17 15 14 15.3 16.0 
1997 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 16 16.0 17 15 16 16.0 16 14 14 14.7 15.6 
1998 AA+ AAA Aa1 16 17 16 16.3 16 15 15 15.3 16 15 15 15.3 16 14 14 14.7 15.1 
1999 AA+ AAA Aa1 16 17 16 16.3 16 15 15 15.3 16 15 15 15.3 16 14 14 14.7 15.1 
2000 AA+ AAA Aa1 16 17 16 16.3 16 15 15 15.3 16 14 15 15.0 16 14 14 14.7 15.0 
2001 AA AA Aa1 15 15 16 15.3 15 14 15 14.7 15 13 13 13.7 16 14 13 14.3 14.2 
2002 AA AA- Aaa 15 14 17 15.3 15 14 14 14.3 15 13 13 13.7 16 14 13 14.3 14.1 
2003 AA AA- Aaa 15 14 17 15.3 15 14 14 14.3 15 13 13 13.7 17 15 14 15.3 14.4 
2004 AA AA- Aaa 15 14 17 15.3 15 14 14 14.3 14 13 13 13.3 17 15 14 15.3 14.3 
2005 AA AA- Aaa 15 14 17 15.3 15 14 14 14.3 14 13 12 13.0 17 15 14 15.3 14.2 
2006 AA AA- Aaa 15 14 17 15.3 15 14 14 14.3 14 13 13 13.3 17 15 14 15.3 14.3 
2007 AA AA Aaa 15 15 17 15.7 15 14 14 14.3 15 13 13 13.7 17 15 14 15.3 14.4 
2008 AA AA Aaa 15 15 17 15.7 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 13 14.3 17 16 15 16.0 15.1 
2009 AA AA Aa2 15 15 16 15.3 15 15 15 15.0 15 13 13 13.7 17 16 14 15.7 14.8 
2010 AA AA Aa3 15 15 16 15.3 15 14 15 14.7 14 13 13 13.3 17 15 14 15.3 14.4 
2011               15 14 15 15 14 13 13 13 17 15 14 15 14.4 
 
Table A8 – Portugal 
 Rating Rating Code Fitch S&P Moody's   
Year Fitch SP M FC17 SPC17 MC17 Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg Avg 
1989  A A1  12 13                    
1990  A A1  12 13                    
1991  A+ A1  13 13                    
1992  A+ A1  13 13                    
1993  AA- A1  14 13                    
1994 AA- AA- A1 14 14 13                    
1995 AA- AA- A1 14 14 13                    
1996 AA- AA- A1 14 14 13 13.7 15 14 14 14.3 14 14 13 13.7 14 15 15 14.7 14.2 
1997 AA- AA- Aa3 14 14 14 14.0 15 15 14 14.7 15 15 13 14.3 15 15 15 15.0 14.7 
1998 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 14 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 14.9 
1999 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 14 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 14.9 
2000 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 14 14.7 15 15 14 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 14.8 
2001 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 14 14.7 15 15 13 14.3 15 15 15 15.0 14.7 
2002 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 14 14.7 15 15 13 14.3 15 16 15 15.3 14.8 
2003 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 14 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 14.9 
2004 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 14 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 14.9 
2005 AA AA- Aa2 15 14 15 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 14 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 14.9 
2006 AA AA- Aa2 15 14 15 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 14 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 14.9 
2007 AA AA- Aa2 15 14 15 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 15 16 14 15.0 15 16 16 15.7 15.2 
2008 AA AA- Aa2 15 14 15 14.7 15 16 15 15.3 15 16 14 15.0 15 16 16 15.7 15.3 
2009 AA A+ Aa2 15 13 15 14.3 15 15 15 15.0 14 15 13 14.0 15 15 15 15.0 14.7 
2010 AA- A- A1 14 11 13 12.7 15 15 15 15.0 14 15 13 14.0 14 15 15 14.7 14.6 




Table A9 – Spain 
 Rating Rating Code Fitch S&P Moody's   
Year Fitch SP M FC17 SPC17 MC17 Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg Avg 
1989  AA Aa2  15 15                   
1990  AA Aa2  15 15                   
1991  AA Aa2  15 15                   
1992  AA Aa2  15 15                   
1993  AA Aa2  15 15                   
1994 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15                  AA 
1995 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15                  AA 
1996 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 15 15.0 16 15 15 15.3 15 15 16 15.3 AA 
1997 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15 15.0 15 15 14 14.7 15 15 15 15.0 16 15 16 15.7 AA 
1998 AA AA Aa2 15 15 15 15.0 16 16 15 15.7 16 16 15 15.7 16 15 16 15.7 AA 
1999 AA+ AA+ Aa2 16 16 15 15.7 16 16 15 15.7 16 16 15 15.7 16 16 16 16.0 AA+ 
2000 AA+ AA+ Aa2 16 16 15 15.7 16 16 15 15.7 16 16 15 15.7 16 16 16 16.0 AA+ 
2001 AA+ AA+ Aaa 16 16 17 16.3 16 16 15 15.7 16 16 15 15.7 16 16 16 16.0 AA+ 
2002 AA+ AA+ Aaa 16 16 17 16.3 16 17 15 16.0 16 16 15 15.7 16 17 17 16.7 AA+ 
2003 AAA AA+ Aaa 17 16 17 16.7 16 17 16 16.3 16 17 16 16.3 16 17 17 16.7 AAA 
2004 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 16 17 16 16.3 16 17 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 AAA 
2005 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 AAA 
2006 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 AAA 
2007 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 AAA 
2008 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 AAA 
2009 AAA AA+ Aaa 17 16 17 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 16 17 16 16.3 16 17 17 16.7 AAA 
2010 AA+ AA Aaa 16 15 17 16.0 16 17 15 16.0 15 16 15 15.3 15 17 16 16.0 AA+ 
2011               16 17 15 16 15 16 15 15 15 16 16 16   
 
Table A10 – U.K. 
 Rating Rating Code Fitch S&P Moody's   
Year Fitch SP M FC17 SPC17 MC17 Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg Avg 
1989  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1990  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1991  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1992  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1993  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1994 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17                    
1995 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17                    
1996 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 16 16 16 16.0 16 17 16 16.3 16 17 17 16.7 16.3 
1997 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 16 17 17 16.7 16.7 
1998 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
1999 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2000 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.8 
2001 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 16.9 
2002 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2003 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2004 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2005 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2006 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2007 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2008 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17 17 17 17.0 17.0 
2009 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 16 17 16 16.3 16 17 16 16.3 16 17 17 16.7 16.4 
2010 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 16 16 16 16.0 16 16 15 15.7 16 17 17 16.7 16.1 




Table A11 – U.S. 
 Rating Rating Code Fitch S&P Moody's   
Year Fitch SP M FC17 SPC17 MC17 Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg RE OP REOP Avg Avg 
1989  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1990  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1991  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1992  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1993  AAA Aaa  17 17                    
1994 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17                    
1995 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17                    
1996 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 16 16.0 16 15 15 15.3 16 16 16 16.0 15.8 
1997 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 16 16.0 17 16 16 16.3 16 16 16 16.0 16.1 
1998 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 16 16.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 16 16.3 16.2 
1999 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 16 16.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.4 
2000 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 16 16.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.4 
2001 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 16 16.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.4 
2002 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 16 16.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.4 
2003 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 16 16.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.4 
2004 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.6 
2005 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.6 
2006 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.6 
2007 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 16 16.7 17 17 17 17.0 16.7 
2008 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 16 16 16.3 17 16 16 16.3 17 17 17 17.0 16.6 
2009 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 16 16.0 16 16 15 15.7 16 16 16 16.0 15.9 
2010 AAA AAA Aaa 17 17 17 17.0 17 15 15 15.7 16 15 15 15.3 16 16 15 15.7 15.6 
2011               16 15 15 15 16 15 14 15 16 16 15 16 15.3 
 
 
